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abstract My main goal in this paper is to vindicate Hume’s belief that morality is exclusively
a matter of sentiment, when it is apparent that the reflective or general perspective necessary
to making a moral judgment requires reason. My solution to the supposed inconsistency is to
show that reason is understood in two ways: in the preliminary understanding, reason is
opposed to sentiment; in the final understanding, reason is actually reduced to sentiment, or
explained away in favor of it. In this final sense, when reason affects morality, it consists in
bringing to the mind imaginary sensations and sentiments to which we react sympathetically.
keywords Hume – sentiments – reason – Moral
1
This paper addresses Hume’s contrast of reason and sentiment in morals,
a contrast forcefully expressed at the very opening of Book 3 of the Trea-
tise, and many times recalled throughout the development of Hume’s
moral theory. In the Treatise Hume questions whether the foundations of
morals rest on reason or on sentiment. His straightforward answer unam-
biguously elects sentiment1.
However, a steady part is conceded for reason to play in morals, a part
that doesn’t seem to be at all negligible. If the distinction between what
founds morals and what contributes to shaping moral experience could be
kept neatly apart, the recognition of reason’s contributions wouldn’t be of
consequence. But the truth is that they cannot, and that the concessions
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progressively made to reason’s procedural role may compromise Hume’s
initial view of the foundation of morals as being solely sentimental. Now
if it is the case that foundations and procedures cannot indeed be disen-
tangled, then the discrepancy between Hume’s explicit dismissal and
subsequent readmission of reason into morals poses a puzzle not unwor-
thy of the attention of his interpreters.
It is my intention to propose a solution to this apparent inconsistency
in Hume’s thought. In other words, I propose to investigate the question
of how to evaluate Hume’s dismissive rhetoric against reason in the light
of his more sober depiction of the manifold involvement of reason in
moral experience, of which the Treatise itself gives numerous examples.
In the conclusion, I argue in favor of a revision in the concept of reason
itself as applied to morals, which represents, I hope, a plausible way out of
the afore-mentioned difficulties of interpretation.
2
I begin with a brief review of Hume’s most forceful rhetoric. In Trea-
tise 2.3.3 Hume draws a robust distinction between reason and
passion. In Treatise 3.1.1 a distinction also holds between reason and
sentiment, with moral implications. Hume makes the claim that
passion, not reason, moves the will and motivates human actions.
Subsequently, he claims moral distinctions to be based on sentiment,
not on reason.
The upshot is that Hume sides with passion and sentiment, taking
position in an ongoing debate that he describes as the “combat of passion
and reason.”The issue at stake is whether reason can “oppose passion in
the direction of the will” and the concomitant moral question of
whether, in case of there being opposition, reason should be given pref-
erence, and humans considered to be “only so far virtuous as they
conform themselves to its dictates” (HUME, 2000, p. 265; italics added).
Against the many who defend one form or another of this view, Hume
affirms that (i) there is no such combat, for (ii) since passion alone moti-
vates human action, then (iii) it is not an option to give preference to
reason, and to associate virtue with it.
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In his own words, he aims to prove “first, that reason alone can never
be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never
oppose passion in the direction of the will” (ibidem).The direct conse-
quence to moral theory of this point in the theory of mind is that it lays
the ground for holding that moral distinctions are not founded on
reason, and that the rules of morals are not conclusions of reason, i.e. they
are not discovered by demonstrative a priori reasoning, nor by probable a
posteriori reasoning. In “Of the Passions” Hume says:“Since reason alone
can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the
same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the
preference with any passion or emotion” (idem, p. 266).
In “Of Morals,” Hume is recalling precisely this point when he affirms
that:“As long as it is allow’d, that reason has no influence on our passions
and actions, ‘tis in vain to pretend, that morality is discover’d only by a
deduction of reason” (idem, p. 294).And that:“Morals excite passions, and
produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this
particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our
reason” (ibidem).
But, to be exact, Hume’s commitment to a side in the debate has a
twist to it, since his choice is not to give acceptance to the opposition,
thence to proceed and cast his vote on passion. Actually, he begins by
squarely refusing the lines along which the dispute is posited, diagnos-
ing the opposition itself as a category mistake, and consequently also
diagnosing as false the moral problems aroused by it, problems such as
whether all motives ought to be subdued or made conformable to
reason, or whether reason is a superior principle against the passions,
for example.
Hume does not say it in as many words, but I find no difficulty in
accepting that when he employs the phrase “a failure to ‘speak philo-
sophically’” he is referring to nothing but this category mistake itself. In
his words:“We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the
combat of passion and of reason” (idem, p. 266). Hume might have added,
we don’t speak strictly and philosophically simply because passion/senti-
ment and reason do not belong in the same category, they are not the
same sort of thing. Each, so to speak, constitutes a category in itself.
Therefore, they can’t possibly lock in combat.
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His argument is quite straightforward.According to Hume, a passion
is an original existence. In his phrasing,“[w]hen I am angry, I am actual-
ly possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference
to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five
foot high” (ibidem).
Now to say that passions are original realities goes for classifying them
as impressions, against copies or representations, i.e. ideas. If passions are
not representations, then they cannot be true or false, since truth is the
agreement of an idea with the object it represents or, more exactly:
“[t]ruth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to
the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact” (idem, p.
295). But reason is defined as “the discovery of truth or falshood.” Hence
neither reason as demonstration, when it compares ideas, nor reason as
probability, when it infers matters of fact, can deal with passion2.
In conclusion, the nature, origin, causes and effects, and other princi-
ples of association of passions constitute an autonomous domain, just as
does the domain of ideas and their principles of association, with the
only difference that passions pertain to human action, and consequent-
ly to morals, whereas ideas pertain to human reason, and consequently
to knowledge.
These two domains appear to be incommensurable. Sensations of
pleasure and pain are the ultimate building blocks of morals.They give
rise to passions of desire and aversion, and these move the will directly
causing action, and indirectly causing the appreciation of action and
character.The gradation of intensity in sensations of pleasure and pain,
which depends on their source’s proximity or distance in space and
time, and immediate or mediate relation to self and others, accounts for
the variety of passions and sentiments, as well as for the distinction
between the sentiments that are said to be moral and those that are not.
Moral evaluation, no less than motivation, seems to be a matter of senti-
ment alone.
In Hume’s picture,“[t]o have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel
a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character.
The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration” (idem, p. 303).
A character may cause either an agreeable or a disagreeable impres-
sion, and to approve or disapprove of it, calling it virtuous or vicious, is to
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give expression to this sentiment (idem, p. 301). Reason and reasoning
are excluded in the precise sense that the move from feeling pleasure to
judging of virtue is not akin to the making of an inference. Hume
emphasizes that “[w]e do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it
pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in
effect feel that it is virtuous” (idem, p. 303).
3
But “pleasure” is a name that stands for very diverse sensations, and the
particular kind of pleasure and pain with which we associate virtue and
vice is the kind that leads to praise or blame. According to Hume, its
specific difference is in that “‘Tis only when a character is considered in
general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a
feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil” (ibidem). For
example, the sentiment of hatred – which is not moral – and the senti-
ment of disapprobation of vice – which is – are distinct in that the
former has self-interest in the forefront whereas the latter does not.
It is precisely at this juncture that I believe reason reenters, in a signif-
icant way, the picture out of which it had been previously excluded.The
utterance of a moral judgment is equal to giving expression to certain
feelings. Nevertheless, it may be the case that, if it weren’t for the exercise
of reason, one wouldn’t be placed in the position that allows for that
unique sort of feeling that is avowedly moral.
The question emerges here as to whether the achievement of the
moral standpoint is an activity of reason, and reason alone. If it is indeed,
then morals can be said to be, in a very essential way, a matter of reason
as much as it is a matter of sentiment.And the stark contrast pictured at
the beginning in the Treatise will call for revision, or at least one will have
to admit that “founding” is a word of equivocal meaning, applying both
to what moral distinctions are based on, in which case sentiments alone
found morals, and to what is an unalienable constituent of moral experi-
ence, in which sense reason too founds morals.
Hume’s approach to this problem is many-layered, to say the least. Its
various fronts, each improving on its antecedent’s shortcomings include:
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(i) initial allotment to reason of influence on a limited number of cases3,
(ii) casting of a widespread doubt on the effectiveness of reason, and (iii)
recasting in non-cognitive terms of some of the so-called rational proce-
dures.The Treatise explores all the aforementioned possibilities. Next, I
will review them, with the intent to show how they fail to secure an
exclusively sentimental foundation to morals, with the exception of
number (iii), which I consider to be successful. But I believe its success
depends on the translation into non-cognitive descriptions of the ration-
al procedures that claim to a bearing on morals.
Initially, Hume allots reason only a restricted margin or a narrow
range of operation, which results in downplaying the significance of its
influence. It amounts to saying: reason has room, not much though, for
it affects only a limited number of cases. Hume seems to take this
approach when he classifies the cases in which judgment and under-
standing play an essential role in morals as somehow special, not stan-
dard ones, as implied by the suggestive label “artificial” that he attaches
to them.
But it doesn’t take much reading beyond the Treatise’s discussion of
the artificial virtues to see how doubtful it is that so sharp a line can
successfully be drawn.After all, reason’s range might be indeterminate, or
it might exceed the limits previously set. It might even be the case that
reason’s intervention is necessary always, and not just exceptionally.
Hume admits that there are times when our natural sympathy and our
moral sentiments do not coincide. We are much less sympathetic to
strangers living at a distance from us in time and space than to acquain-
tances living close by. Despite this variance in sympathy, our moral
concern is or should be the same in all cases as a result precisely of reason
being able to position us in the moral “steady and general point of view”
that neutralizes our partiality (idem, sec. 3.3.1). Considering how
constantly our situation changes, Hume argues, it is good that reason can
operate this correction on our sentiments, for otherwise we wouldn’t
ever hold onto any steady position and would frequently, perhaps incor-
rigibly, be very partial.
Actually, Hume continues, reason operates along the very same lines
in morals as it does in knowledge and criticism, when it effects constant
corrections and adjustments in the perceptions of our senses and in our
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judgments regarding beauty (idem, p. 371-372). Don’t we, for example,
routinely correct by reflection our judgment about the sizes of distant
objects? The same goes for our appreciation of characters seen at a
distance: our sensitivity to their moral beauty or deformity would be
diminished if it weren’t for the routine corrective operation of judgment
and reflection.
But then, the neat, restrictive distinction between the cases that neces-
sitate the contribution of reason and the ones that don’t loses a great deal
of its sharpness. The boundary is somewhat blurred, and it seems that
nothing can in principle be trusted infallibly to circumscribe the reach of
reason, for if the correction of our natural sympathy is conducted by
reason, and if this correction happens as a rule, then the limit set by the
notion of artificial virtues, for example, has been trespassed. It is conceiv-
able, and it remains an empirical matter to be ascertained, as Hume’s text
suggests, that reason operates in at least some cases of moral appreciation
of the so-called natural virtues and vices. One cannot determine, with
much assurance, where reason enters and where it doesn’t.Thus sudden-
ly one finds oneself more or less at a loss over what to say with definite-
ness about the foundations of morals.
4
At the same time, in a skeptical frame of mind, Hume observes that
neither is the mechanism by which reason conduces to a moral stand-
point “altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often correspond
entirely to the present theory,” i. e. he notes that “reason requires such an
impartial conduct, but that ‘tis seldom we can bring ourselves to it...
[since] our passions do not readily follow the determination of our judg-
ment” (idem, p. 372).
In the same skeptical frame of mind, and relying on the argument
from relativity, Hume also, on several occasions, observes that:“So little
are men govern’d by reason in their sentiments and opinions, that they
always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic
worth and value” (idem, p. 240). Finally, he repeatedly recalls that
notwithstanding the influence of reason “[r]esemblance and proximity
155
doispontos, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 2, p.149-166, jan/jun, 2005
always produce a relation of ideas” (idem, p. 243), in morals just as in all
other sorts of human experience, and that there isn’t really a way to be
rid of this tendency or to be immunized against its force.The conclusion
is that human nature at worst runs counter to, and at best minimizes, the
efficacy of reason’s influence in morals.
With the skeptical arguments above, Hume appears to be arguing that
although an indeterminate, perhaps even wide, potential reach may have
to be conceded to reason, yet in actuality reason’s effectiveness is dubious.
This way, the role reason had just been given is somehow subverted:
reason may be wide reaching in possibility, but it is, in practice, mostly
ineffective. Even so, indeterminacy is not final; it can be dealt with.
Although the situation evidently calls for remedial measures, these may
well be within our reach, and we must make it our goal to guarantee,
whenever possible, conditions favorable to the unimpeded activity of
reason in those many cases in which, without it, we couldn’t properly be
considered moral.
Or perhaps, if Hume’s skeptical appeal to human nature signals that
the moral malfunctioning of humans is irremediable, yet it could be held
that, if not at all times when one is moral, at least a significant part of
one’s moral experience occurs when reason succeeds in carrying one’s
view onto the general level, countering particularly interested passion.
The acknowledgement that if and when one achieves a general moral
stance it is due to the corrective effect of reason on the person’s sponta-
neous sentiments suffices to reinstall reason at the center stage of morals.
The message here is that at such times, infrequent and scarce as they may
be, one is moral owing to one’s being rational.
Reason thus persists as an essential factor in morals, and, what is more
important, no less foundational in quality than sentiment itself, for the
conclusion seems to be that without reason there is no morals, at least not
morals as we know it4.The want of reason would have a costly, limiting
effect on our moral experiences, both with regard to their success and to
their compass. Hence a closer approach not only seems to soften the
contrast, but also tends to grant reason the upper hand in morals. Para-
doxical as it may sound, given the initial premises of Hume’s account, the
fact may well be that morality calls for very high cognitive capabilities,
just the sort that humans alone possess.
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Many animals besides us are sentient and do obtain knowledge of
causes, for example. Hume credits non-human as well as human animals
with the possession of reason and passion, and knowledge of matter of
fact. He does not however attribute knowledge of relations of ideas, nor
perhaps morality either, to non-humans. Could it be so because such are
cases that require very powerfully exercised and finely tuned cognitive
abilities, found only in human subjects? If this is the case, the general
standpoint that makes morals possible would parallel the abstract stand-
point necessary for the knowledge of relations of ideas, requiring of those
who achieve it that they be able to hold steadily and consistently in mind
complex notions and relations, of self and others, and also that they be
able to perform minute spatiotemporal adjustments in their views.
5
Such a conclusion has to be approached with caution though, on
account of some mitigating factors, the most marked of which I believe
would be conceptual clarification. In Book 2 of the Treatise, the combat
of reason and passion was dismissed on conceptual grounds.The “strug-
gle of reason and passion” was cast anew not simply by reason being
shown not to have influence on the will, but also by cases being exam-
ined that, although in appearance instances of such struggle, were in real-
ity cases of a struggle between calm and violent passions.The conclusion
was that at times we improperly take for reason what in truth is calm
passion. In Hume’s words:“What we commonly understand by passion is
a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is
presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our facul-
ties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason, we mean affections of the
very same kind with the former; but such as operate more calmly, and
cause no disorder in the temper” (idem, p. 280).
Against our common view and way of speaking, Hume, in this
context, affirms that calm desires and tendencies are passions too, but
productive of little, hardly noticeable emotion in the mind. They “are
more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation”
(idem, p. 268). But reason raises no emotion, no pleasure, and no uneasi-
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ness at all.Therein lies its fundamental difference. Only this difference is
“not immediately distinguishable to the feeling and perception.” And
that’s how reason and calm passion get to be confounded (idem, p. 267).
This finding extends to morals in the following manner: because
reflection brings us up to a general and disinterested point of view that
is destitute of strong emotional charge, and has the appearance of
being entirely devoid of emotion, it gets confounded with reason as
well. Likewise, contrary to first appearances, the agent placed in such a
standpoint is in a sentimental state, although a state constituted by
calm, not violent passions. As Hume points out: “reason, which is able
to oppose our passion... [is] nothing but a general calm determination
of the passions, formed on some distant view or reflexion” (idem, p.
372-373).
But there is nothing new in the statement that the effects, if they are
moral, of one’s being positioned in a general point of view, are sentimen-
tal. It amounts to no more than a restatement of the principle that moral
stance is sentimental, and that moral judgment is expression of sentiment,
albeit sometimes sentiment in disguise. But can reflection in like manner
be explained in such terms?
To the lingering question of whether reflection, or the cause of
certain sentimental moral states, is synonymous with reason, the answer,
I believe, is no.This is not an obvious answer though, for the overcom-
ing of self and diminution of personal involvement, on the one hand,
and broad view and general perspective, on the other, seem to be
features of typical rational behavior.After all, detachment and generali-
ty, disinterest and neutrality do make up a set of properties we common-
ly attribute to rationality. Hume chooses to call it reflection, but it does
not seem clear, at first sight, what could prevent it from being called by
the name of reason.
For Hume, to hold a reflective point of view, in one sense, amounts to
the following: “When we consider any objects at a distance, all their
minute distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to whatev-
er is in itself preferable, without considering its situation and circum-
stances.This gives rise to what in an improper sense we call reason, which
is a principle, that is often contradictory to those propensities that display
themselves upon the approach of the object. In reflecting on any action,
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which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I always resolve to prefer
the greater good, whether at that time it will be more contiguous or
more remote; nor does any difference in that particular make a difference
in my present intentions and resolutions. My distance from the final
determination makes all those minute differences vanish, nor am I affect-
ed by anything, but the general and more discernable qualities of good
and evil” (idem, p. 343-344).
I find this passage revealing.Taking distance from oneself ensures the
moral appreciation of other agents’ actions and characters. Equally rele-
vant to morals is a distancing from one’s own immediate prospects,
which encourages moral excellence in the agent’s own choices. Both
kinds are similar, and similarly relevant. Now what I find remarkable
here is Hume’s seeming suggestion that a limitation and “infirmity” of
human nature, namely the lack of minute discrimination in our percep-
tion of objects viewed at a distance, is cause of our being inclined to the
greater good, namely of our becoming better discriminating moral
agents; and that this is what the reflective positioning of ourselves, or the
gaining distance from immediate pleasure, comes to. I believe the same
can be said of the reflective distancing that makes for good moral appre-
ciation of others.
At this juncture, what characterizes the moral outlook does not, not
even by the utmost effort, fit the description of what would generally be
accepted to be an operation of reason, or a cognitive achievement.
Neutrality and generality are indeed attributes of reflection, but reflec-
tion, in this case, literally translates into sentiment – the reflective point of
view is synonymous with a state of calm passional stimulation. One valu-
able move, as I said, is realizing, on a closer look, that there is passion and
sentiment to be found in situations where apparently there isn’t any, and
the discovery of subdued emotions, calm passions, gentle sentiments
where there seemed to be none.An altogether different move is to take
hold of things most typically identifiable with rationality, explaining them
away as belonging in the sensory/sentimental category. I believe Hume
goes thus far in his account of reflection, leaving his reader to wonder: if
generality is not to be identified with reason, what then5?
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6It is a necessary condition for the existence of morality that one perceive
oneself and others as similar but distinct identities; and also that one
envisage oneself in circumstances that go beyond here and now.These
perceptions are possible only because one can imaginarily feel passions
and sentiments in broader-reaching and more inclusive ways.Thus senti-
mentally speaking a general or remote view is nothing like a lesser view,
as would be the case if it were phrased cognitively. It is rather a state of
sentiments of a particular sort, in fact the state requisite for an experience
to qualify as moral.
When the moral general standpoint is explained not negatively, as a sort
of sensory deprivation, but positively, as procuring sympathy and extended
sympathy, it likewise does not require reference to reason, when conditions
that might be cast in terms of rational behavior are instead preferably
displayed in sensory and imaginative terms, which once again are ultimate-
ly reducible to passional and sentimental terms, averse to cognitive phrasing.
Hume’s theory of mind shows that a vivid impression naturally brings
to mind and communicates its vivacity to any associated idea; as a result,
the mind, or imagination, moves with ease from one to the other.
Because we humans are so similar, each of us can very easily have a share
in the sentiments of others, for it is quite easy to endow the idea we have
of them with a share of the vivacity pertaining to ideas we have of
ourselves (idem, sec. 2.1.11).To sympathize is precisely “the conversion of
an idea into an impression by the force of imagination” (idem, p. 273).
And, to use Hume’s phrase, what is taking place in such a conversion is
nothing other than a “communication of passions” (idem, p. 255). Its
morality resides in its making our sensibility not limited to our own
pleasure and pain, sensuous or social, real or imaginary, by making us
sensitive too to the pleasure and pain of any other being with whom we
happen to be imaginatively associated.
The closer a thing is to us, the more vivid become the ideas of its
features, to the point, in some cases, where they feel like impressions.
Whenever we imaginatively perceive the pleasant and painful circum-
stances of other beings, they’ll no longer be indifferent to us, for when
we imagine, we feel too, and tend towards or against, and, if we are able
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to, we’ll seek or avoid that which thus moves us. Our sympathy can
expand to reaches that go well beyond our most proximate surroundings,
and embrace distant human and perhaps even non-human communities
and individuals6.This is precisely “extended sympathy” – an imaginative
sort of reaching out which enables us to turn outwards more extensively
the natural benevolence that, under different conditions, would remain
narrowly restricted. It applies to those cases when sentiments get expand-
ed owing to the fact that their bearer is at the time contemplating broad-
er imaginary horizons of pleasure and pain, which pertain to an also
broader population of sentient beings.To them one relates sympatheti-
cally as one who “anticipate[s] by the force of imagination” their pleas-
ures and pains (idem, p. 248).
All cases of sympathy, restricted or extended, consist of imaginative
display of sentimental states, and so do morals.The standard of moral taste
itself is established by what Hume calls an “intercourse of sentiments,”
attested by the passage in the Treatise that reads: “In like manner, tho’
sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and a sympa-
thy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons
near and contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in our calm
judgments concerning the characters of men. Besides, that we ourselves
often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with
persons, who are in a different situation from ourselves, and who cou’d
never converse with us on any reasonable terms, were we to remain
constantly in that situation, which is peculiar to us. The intercourse of senti-
ments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general inalter-
able standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners”
(idem, p. 385; italics added).
Sentiments and their expression account not only for moral judg-
ment, but also for the standards that guide judgments, as well as for reflec-
tion, by means of which standards are achieved. Reflection, as we have
seen, is an imaginative positioning of oneself in another place or time, so
as to have a glimpse of the sentiments one would feel in that position. In
those occasions sentiments may be faint, but imagination suffices to
direct our inclination, for: “Sentiments must touch the heart, to make
them controul our passions; But they need not extend beyond the imag-
ination, to make them influence our taste” (idem, p. 374).
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In short, for a situation to be considered moral, not only one’s atten-
tion has to be directed to its sentimental qualities, but also the whole of
the situation, and not just aspects of it, has to be envisaged as sentimen-
tal. All that is empirical or factual, and likewise all that is normative, is
actually rendered, and perceived, or felt, as a state of sentiments.
7
Having agreed that moral experience as such is sentimental, my final
question is then: won’t there always be a non-sentimental residue to all
accounts of morals? Indeed there remains one basic residual level, where
reason and cognition do influence the process and outcome of the
combat of passions.
What I have in mind is first, the mere fact that a necessary condition
for a passion to be aroused is the preceding belief in the existence of its
object, a cognitive precedent. As Hume observes, a sense in which a
passion can be diagnosed as unreasonable applies when it “is founded on
the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist”
(idem, p. 267). And secondly, the fact that human action involves the
activity of reason as it judges probabilities, either in referring action to
character, or in fitting means to ends, or yet in pointing out causal rela-
tions between objects, and thus enabling transmission of propensity or
aversion from objects that immediately give pleasure and pain to their
mediate associates.
Judgment and belief precede and accompany the passions, and they
make a difference to the arrangements of passions that develop into
action and into moral evaluation (idem, p. 267, 295-296). In numerous
cases, the arousal of affections is caused by “the imagination, according to
the light in which it places its object” (idem, p. 245), and “a double rela-
tion of ideas and impressions” causes the transition of passions (idem, p.
248). The mutual influence of ideas and affections translates into
complete reciprocal dependency of passion and reason, both in the arous-
al and in the transition of passions.
This point is best illustrated by the Treatise’s analyses of the indirect
passions of pride and humility, love and hate,where associated ideas give to
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impressions of pleasure and pain the precise turn that results in one specif-
ic passion being felt. But with regard to the direct passions as well, the
pleasure or pain, propensity or aversion, that specifically determines each
one of them, is itself determined by its appearing to us probable or improb-
able, certain or uncertain, in or out of our power.Any particular passion
cannot be taken apart from, and would not even be what it is without its
empirical circumstances and the way they are perceived. The ‘light in
which an object is placed’ is the result of a cognitive evaluation of its status.
Now when the passional basis itself of human behavior is so mixed
with reason, so will naturally be the whole edifice of morals. It seems that
when one attempts to account for the mutual influence of reason and
passion, one soon finds them to be so very entangled that to set them
apart is almost impossible. When their disentanglement proves to be
possible, it seems almost to be vain.
In the Treatise, Hume points out that moral philosophers take the
“liberty” to consider “any motion as compounded and consisting of two
parts separate from each other, tho’ at the same time they acknowledge it
to be in itself uncompounded and inseparable” (idem, p. 317). If Hume’s
insight is correct, human action likewise is “in itself uncompounded and
inseparable,” and the distinction that Hume makes between a part
belonging to the affections and a part belonging to the understanding
strictly is an expository device in the study of morals. But I also believe
that of the two categories, sentiment is the one that is ever bound to
prevail. However much the coarse-grained description of human action
and morals may make use of the instrumental distinction between reason
and sentiment, the fine-grained description of the same phenomena is
conducive to its ultimate dismissal, and to the conclusion that whereas
reason may be explained away in terms of sentiment, sentiment itself is
original and irreducible.
It is always possible to analyze the whole moral domain, including its
cognitive components, into clusters of impressions of pleasure and pain,
at times highly complex clusters, comparable to a field of forces. In this
picture, moral phenomena would constitute a setting where impressions
and ideas, vivid or faint, are but gradations of pleasure and pain, desire
and aversion.Thus when we contemplate the prospect of a determinate
pleasure as probable, probable in this case stands for something like “a
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pleasure felt to a certain degree.”This exact degree qualifies it as imag-
ined, not actual, and imagined as probable, not certain.
Ultimately, reason operating in moral reasoning is more properly
imagination at work on sketches of possible situations, bringing close or
taking away in time and space sources of pleasure and pain, for us and
others, and thus exerting an influence on our inclinations, especially inso-
far as it promotes a new equilibrium among violent and calm passions,
measures greater and lesser goods against one another, ascertains general
and particular, close and remote points of view, so that, in consequence,
moral choice takes place in conditions that reach, in many cases, far
beyond the agent’s most immediate circumstances.
In other words, reason is a name we apply to certain psychological
processes we observe in big brained beings, such as humans, who are
endowed with a relatively broad scope of memory and imagination, and
who are capable to bring to mind various imaginary scenarios other than the
scenario they perceive, or rather feel, presently.This imaginative exercise can
take place at the very moment in which, under the effect of certain current
stimuli, they are being inclined towards a proximate pleasure or away from a
proximate pain, thus affecting their inclinations at that moment. Obviously,
as a result, their choices and moral evaluations may shift.
The “reason” to which Hume in so many passages allows a part to play
is more exactly an “expansion or broadening of sentiments.”Annette Baier
(1991) has given a close and very insightful analysis of this phenomenon.
In her view, Hume widens the concept of reason, and conceives of reflec-
tion as an enriched exercise of reason, which is passionate and social. She
views Humean passions themselves as having beliefs both for their causes
and components, therefore as entities with cognitive content. Contrarily
to Baier, it seems to me that, for Hume, reason in morals equals impres-
sions felt in a certain manner. Concomitantly, in the moral sphere, belief
itself turns to be just another way of feeling.
8
To conclude, this paper began with the idea that reason and sentiment
would constitute for Hume two independent domains, the latter alone
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having any essential bearing on morals. In what I’d call the stark or
robust distinction, Hume would single out passion and sentiment alone
as determining and founding human action and morality, to the exclu-
sion of reason.
The paper then probed several ways in which Hume accedes or might
accede to reason’s contribution to morals: from reason as an antecedent,
to reason as an integral part of moral experience; and from reason as a
necessary condition, to reason as an auxiliary tool. These possibilities
would suggest a more mitigated view of the mutual exclusion of reason
and passion/sentiment, so that human moral psychology would appear at
least as a mixed breed that integrates both kinds.
The paper finally proposed a view in which reason itself was defined
anew, wholly in terms of imaginative functioning of the mind, the raw
material of which would be passions and sentiments. Due to such reduc-
tion, or “explaining away” of reason, morals thus appear, in a new sense,
but still wholly, as a matter of sentiment.
1 I gave an earlier version of this essay to the Department of Philosophy at University of
Western Ontario, June, 2000. I wish to thank Tom Lennon and his colleagues at UWO, and
also Don Garrett, Simon Blackburn, Bill Lycan, and John Russell Roberts for their ines-
timable help.Thanks also to the editors of Dois Pontos, in particular to Isabel Limongi.A grant
from CNPq, Brazil, allowed me to visit abroad.
2 A cautionary note: that reason and passion cannot affect each other at all is but a provisory
notion in the Treatise, soon to be abandoned.The Treatise as a whole, as will be noted later in
this paper, corrects it, at the same time as it invites the question of how is it that reason, or
whatever it is that the term stands for, by working on the passions, can indeed produce action
or a new passion.
3 At first, Hume assigns different domains of inquiry to each reason and passion: passion as
sentiment makes moral distinctions (HUME, 2000, sec. 3.1.1, 3.3), and establishes the natural
virtues (idem, sec. 3.3), whereas reason actuates in establishing the artificial virtues (idem, sec.
3.2.1).
4 It suffices to say that without the general point of view and sympathy human moral expe-
rience would be sensibly impoverished. Another question, about which I’d rather suspend
judgment for the moment, is whether either is essential to morals. For a sustained discussion,
see Àrdal (1966, ch. 5).
5 Moreover, I believe the passage above also signals that if rational or cognitive standards were
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to apply to an account of the general, removed, or reflective standpoint of morals, we would
be led into the quasi-paradoxical acceptance that a view that we would declare to be poor,
according to those standards, is precisely the sort that allows for a moral stance that we tend,
rightly, to consider rich and supple; in short, that epistemic minuses make for moral pluses. I
take this threat of paradox as further warning against the danger of applying cognitive param-
eters in the casting of moral phenomena.
6 In principle any being, if sentient, could be accorded moral consideration, notwithstanding
its not being human, or not being very close to us. Ultimately, it all depends on the scope of
our own imagination.
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